California's Health Care Gamble: Can We Afford the Trend Toward PPO?



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President and Chief Executive Officer






August 23, 2005



The Market Share Shift Has Begun



Caiifornia Association of Physician Groups

Source: California Health Care Foundation




The Driving Forces

National
Employer
Single
Source
Purchasing
California
outnumbered 49:1

Path of Least Resistance to Deductible Benefit Design



What's the Big Deal?



The Choice is NOT as simple as the first-year's savings



More Than A Product Name



PPO

Organized Care

Disaggregated Care



Prepayment

Fee For Service Payment

Outcome Incentive

Increased Services Incentive


Embedded Care Processes

Over-layed Care Processes





California HMO Premiums remain highest-value health care purchase




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Source: California Health Care Foundation



California HMO Premiums remain highest-value health care purchase




Caiifornia Association of Physician Groups

Source: California Health Care Foundation



CA Results in Hospital Use Rates Are Superior to National Rates




Caiifornia Association of Physician Groups

Source: Kaiser Family Foundation




Hospital LOS Management is Material Driver of Results - Particular in Medical Admissions





The Pressure Is On





Employer Response: The Means and the End

High Deductible Reduce Benefits Savings Accounts

Common Wisdom

PPO Design FFS Payment

Chosen Path

Consequences


Undermine Delivery Model Performance



Inability to Manage Deductibles

Health
Plan
Hospital & RX
Claims





Medical
Group
Professional
Claims





Simultaneous Transacting Real-Time Accumulators



Management Principles At Work in Organized Delivery Systems

Strategic Resource Allocation

ROI Mentality

Staff Recruitment and Teamwork

Organized to Optimize the Whole

Data Driven

Incent Improvement
Organizational → Individual

Leverage
Technology &
Volume



What Gets Lost in the Shift?

Strategic Resource llocation

Staff Recruitment

Data Driven

ROI Mentality


Or an ed to Optimize the Whole

Incent Improvement
Organizational Individual



Optimizing Technology

Administrative vs Cost and Quality Improvement



Stand-Alone Office

Automation
Record Keeping/Transacting

Integrated Network



Leverage Communications

EMR → EHR

Registries

Clinical Team Communication

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Pay for Performance Systemic Quality Improvement

112 Medical Groups

40,000 **Physicians**



First Year Results

Prevention

- Breast Cancer Screening

- Cervical Cancer Screening

- Childhood Immunizations

- Diabetes Testing

Increase of

135,000

150,000

10,000

18,000

Disease Management

- Asthma
- Diabetes
- Heart Disease
- Blood Pressure **Total Avoidable Costs**

Avoidable Deaths

800-1000

4,300-9,600

6,900-17,000

15,000-26,000

\$250 Million

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Can't the Plan do it?

Health Plans

Medical Groups

Stand-Alone Inpatient Services



Integrated with all Care Delivery

Engages Member But Not Physician



Engages Members And Physicians

Large Networks
Diffuse Volume



Service-Specific Leveraged Volume



Reality Not Threat: Cost Increases

50% of Members selected a Clinic that changed from Physician Capitation to Fee-For-Service on 1-1-2004

10-Month Experience Periods	Members Covered	Physician Capitation	Physician FFS Claims	Outpatient FFS Claims*	Total M.D. Capitation & Claims
3/03 - 12/03	3,260	\$2,124,577	\$252,180	\$298,491	\$2,675,248
3/04 - 12/04	3,127	\$1,454,009	\$1,795,638	\$674,616	\$3,924,263
% Change	-4%	-32%	+612%	+126%	+47%

^{*} Includes diagnostic x-ray and lab outpatient surgery.



The Incomplete Economics

- Deductible-based plans were the norm in the 1980's when trend topped 20% - what will be different?
- The care requiring most management and most patient engagement - occurs AFTER the first \$1000 is spent
- Physicians control up to 87% of health spending. Current options only incentivize increased spending



Consequences: Disproportional Effect

 Disproportionately affects low wageearning employees
 resulting in under-care

 Effects of undercare ultimately cost the system more

2004*

Because of Cost	All CA	Income <25,000
Did not obtain a preventive service	17%	24%
Did not visit doctor for known condition	15%	20%
Did not follow medical advice	16%	23%

*Source: California Health Care Foundation



Eventual Increase in Employer **Trend**

Year One	<u>Year</u>	Two
	Option A	Ор

10% Trend Increase

Per Person

Medical Costs

Deductible

Benefit

\$3,000

-\$1,000

\$2,000

Employee Share or Trend?

\$3,300

-\$1,000

\$2,300

+15%

Option B

\$3,300 -\$1,100


\$2,200

+10%

Barney & Barney



Can We Afford the Migration?



\$8.5 Billion Per Year

14,000,000 Californians in Commercial HMOs

X

\$609 per year = \$8,526,000,000

Per Person Per Month CA HMO Costs: \$259.25

Per Person Per Month US PPO Costs: \$310.00

Difference: \$50.75/mo → \$609/yr



Seizing the Opportunity

Financing & Delivery

Model



Product & Benefit Design

Co-Insurance Based Benefit Design



Effectively Leveraged
Data & Info Technology

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Long Term Success Requires Alignment on Direction

Consumers

Cost & Quality Incentives

Providers

Co-insurance to engage in longterm care financing

Radical RX design

Incentives for

- Achieving Disease Management Goals
- Healthy Lifestyles
- Selecting of high-performing provider
- Avoidance of poor-performing providers

Prepayment for overall cost management

Reward for total health care cost/outcome management

Incentives for

- Prevention
- Technology
- Promotion of Healthy Lifestyles
- Performance in Disease Management
- Demonstrated Improved Outcomes

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